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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that a warrant is
not required to perform a breath test of an individual arrested on
suspicion of driving while intoxicated because such a search falls
into the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
†
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1

requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In so concluding, the
court also held that a statute criminalizing one’s refusal to take a
breath test did not violate his or her due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment because no fundamental right was
2
violated.
This case note first discusses the relevant case law surrounding
Fourth Amendment searches in general and the justification
3
required to conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment. It
next discusses the facts and procedural history of the Bernard case,
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s findings and holdings, and the
4
opinion of the dissenters. This note also examines how the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding contradicts Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by misinterpreting the search-incident5
to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. This note argues
that, based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a warrantless
search of one’s breath following an arrest is not justified under the
6
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
Also addressed in this note is how the holding violates public policy
considerations courts often consider in due process violation
7
situations. Finally, this note will conclude that Bernard’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because
Minnesota has effectively criminalized his right to refuse
8
unconstitutional searches.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT CASE LAW
A.

Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches

Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution provide that the people shall be secure in their
9
persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. Originally, the

1. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 772 (Minn. 2015).
2. Id. at 773–74.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. In some circumstances,
the Minnesota Constitution has been interpreted as providing greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Acher v. Comm’r
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Fourth Amendment was limited to protecting individuals from
unreasonable searches by federal officials, but not from
10
unreasonable searches by state officials. In Weeks v. United States,
the Supreme Court interpreted the protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment as requiring evidence obtained as a result of
an unreasonable search to be prohibited from use by the
11
government against the accused at trial. This rule has come to be
12
known as the “exclusionary rule.” The Fourth Amendment has
since been incorporated to apply to state officials as well as federal
officials through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
13
Amendment.
Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 184–85 (Minn. 1994) (holding the use of temporary
road blocks in order to conduct random investigatory stops on vehicles in the
hope of finding drunk drivers was in violation of Minnesota Constitution Article I,
Section 10 in contradiction to Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990), which held that such a practice was not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); see also State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999) (noting
that in situations where “the Supreme Court’s decisions [were] ‘radical’ or ‘sharp’
departures from precedent,” deviation from federal holdings may be appropriate).
However, generally, Article 1, Section 10 of Minnesota’s Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution have been interpreted as
providing the same protections. Id. at 658. In light of this general interpretation,
this case note will treat the two provisions as providing the same amount of
protection.
10. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
11. Id. (“We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were
taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States . . . in
direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant . . . . In holding them
and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was
committed.”).
12. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961) (deriving the Court’s
rationale from Weeks as “the Weeks exclusionary rule”).
13. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). While Wolf held that the
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not extend the exclusionary rule delineated in
Weeks to apply to evidence obtained illegally from state officials. Id. It was not until
Mapp that the exclusionary rule was extended to protect citizens from the use of
evidence obtained illegally by state officials. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. In Mapp, the
Supreme Court stated:
Were it otherwise, then just as . . . the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be “a form of words”, valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so epemeral [sic] and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
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A search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when the government intrudes into an area where a person has a
14
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”
What is considered
reasonable is an objective test; it is not enough that an individual
expects privacy. What matters is whether a reasonable person
15
under the circumstances would expect privacy. “What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
16
may be constitutionally protected.”
Just because a search or seizure has occurred under the Fourth
Amendment does not mean one’s constitutional rights have been
violated. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against “all
17
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” As
the Court stated in Weeks, protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures
took its origin in the determination of the framers of the
Amendments to the Federal Constitution to provide for
that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to the American
people . . . those safeguards which had grown up in
England to protect the people from unreasonable

evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)).
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. 2002).
15. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“The [Fourth]
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but
only those ‘expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original))).
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). The
objective nature of this test has certainly resulted in some interesting holdings by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)
(finding no objective reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left on the
side of the curb in front of one’s home because “it is common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public”);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (finding no objective reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of one’s backyard that was surrounded by “a
six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard”
blocking view at ground level because the yard was visible by aircraft from a height
of 1,000 feet in navigable airspace).
17. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
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searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the
general warrants issued under authority of the
government, by which there had been invasions of the
home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their
private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary,
18
made against them.
A general warrant, as described in this context, “is one that
does not specify the items to be searched for or the persons to be
19
arrested.” A general warrant also does not require a showing of
20
probable cause to be issued. It was in “[r]esistance to these
practices . . . [that] the principle which was enacted into the
fundamental law in the [Fourth] Amendment, that a man’s house
was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to
21
search and seize his goods and papers” was established. Although
the Fourth Amendment has generally been interpreted in terms of
protecting privacy, perhaps its protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures is better described as protecting individual
22
autonomy against unreasonable intrusion by governmental officials.
B.

Justifying Governmental Intrusion

The remainder of the Fourth Amendment provides that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
23
and the persons or things to be seized.” The Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures through its
24
warrant requirement.

18. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
19. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 212 (2015).
20. Id.
21. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390.
22. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (“It is not the
breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense . . . .” (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (“The bulwark of Fourth
Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent
certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested
magistrate before embarking upon a search.”).
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Any search under the Fourth Amendment must be supported
25
by probable cause and a warrant or an exception to the warrant
26
requirement. The Supreme Court has adopted a “totality-of-thecircumstances approach” in determining whether probable cause
27
exists. “The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
28
probabilities.”
In addition to probable cause, governmental officials need a
29
warrant to justify a search of a person or their property. A neutral
magistrate is to determine whether probable cause exists based on
30
oath or affirmation by the official seeking the warrant. A
warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, subject to “specifically established and well-delineated
31
exceptions.” There are several recognized exceptions to the
32
warrant requirement. Many of these exceptions derive out of
25. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that any full search under the
Fourth Amendment must be accompanied by probable cause. The Supreme Court
has recognized searches that fall short of a full search. In the landmark Fourth
Amendment case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized a type of search
that was something less than a full search, one that is “limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby” during an investigatory stop. 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). Such searches
need not be accompanied by probable cause, but only reasonable suspicion where
“a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. at 27. Because Bernard involves a
full search, this case note will focus on the justifications for full searches.
26. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (discussing the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (discussing officer safety and the preservation of
evidence as justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception); Katz, 389
U.S. at 357.
27. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
28. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
29. See, e.g., McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558; Gant, 556 U.S. at 338; Katz, 389 U.S.
at 357.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The oath or affirmation provision requires “that
a warrant affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the
existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent
evaluation of the matter.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). The
Fourth Amendment “takes the affiant’s good faith as its premise,” requiring that
the underlying facts and circumstances be “‘truthful’ in the sense that the
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.”
Id. at 164, 165.
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
32. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558–59 (recognizing an exigent circumstances
exception to protect imminent destruction of evidence, provide emergency
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public policy concerns, such as “law enforcement’s need to provide
emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . or enter a
33
burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.” It is
important to remember, however, that a warrantless search is
presumed to be unreasonable; it can become reasonable only if the
34
situation would justify it.
Courts also decide whether to “exempt a given type of search
from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
35
legitimate governmental interests.’” The exception to the warrant
requirement on which this case note will focus is the search36
incident-to-arrest exception. However, some discussion on the
exigent circumstances exception is necessary to provide useful
background information for a better understanding of the issues in
Bernard, as the two exceptions overlap in some respects.
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed “whether
the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a
per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to the
warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk37
driving investigations.” The defendant was arrested on suspicion
38
of driving while being impaired. After the arrest, the officer asked
39
the defendant to submit to a breath test, and he refused. The
officer informed the defendant that, under Missouri law, refusing
to submit to a chemical test could result in license revocation for
up to a year with the possibility of the refusal being used at a
40
subsequent criminal proceeding. After the defendant refused, the
41
officer transported him to a nearby hospital for a blood test. After
assistance, or to allow police to maintain “hot pursuit” of a suspect); Gant, 566 U.S.
at 338 (recognizing a search-incident-to-arrest exception).
33. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559.
34. Id. (“[A] warrantless search is potentially reasonable because ‘there is
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” (quoting
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978))).
35. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. 133 S. Ct. at 1558.
38. Id. at 1556–57.
39. Id. at 1557.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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the defendant refused to take the blood test, the officer ordered
42
the lab technician to take a blood sample anyway. The defendant
43
moved to suppress the blood test and succeeded at trial. The trial
court concluded the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply to the natural dissipation of
44
alcohol in the blood stream.
The case was appealed all the way to the United States
Supreme Court, which held that “in drunk-driving investigations,
the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting
a blood test without a warrant,” refusing to acknowledge a “per se
45
exigency” in all DWI cases. The Supreme Court acknowledged,
however, that under certain circumstances, a warrantless search of
one’s blood could be justified by an exigency, but the exigency
“must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
46
circumstances.” It is important to remember this holding when
analyzing the majority’s opinion in Bernard.
C.

Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception

One exception to the warrant requirement arises when the
47
search is incident to a lawful arrest. The search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement “derives from interests in
officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically
48
implicated in arrest situations.” The search-incident-to-arrest
exception serves two purposes. First, an arresting officer may search
a person arrested “in order to remove any weapons” that person
might have on them; [o]therwise, the officer’s safety might well be
49
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.” Second, an arresting
officer may search “the area ‘within his immediate control’—
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
50
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” The
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1568.
46. Id. at 1563.
47. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
48. Gant, 566 U.S. at 338.
49. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
50. Id.
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purpose of this is “to prevent [the evidence’s] concealment or
51
destruction.” Limiting the search-incident-to-arrest exception to a
specific, narrow interpretation “ensures that the scope of a search
incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting
arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of
52
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” The searchincident-to-arrest exception is strictly limited to serve these two
53
purposes.
One place that the Supreme Court considered essentially off54
limits from warrantless searches is a person’s home. This includes
55
warrantless searches incident to arrest. Such protection is
grounded in important privacy and policy considerations.
D.

Right to Due Process of Law

Both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution
provide that the government shall not “deprive any person of life,
56
liberty, or property without due process of law.” Due process has
57
both a procedural component and a substantive component. In

51. Id.
52. Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.
53. Id. (“If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area
that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the searchincident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”).
54. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948) (noting that
requiring a warrant be issued by a neutral magistrate prior to a search “was done
not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities” but
“was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy
in order to enforce the law”). The Court in McDonald explained that “[t]he right
of privacy [is] precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.” Id. The Court went on to point out
that power is dangerous, and stressed the importance of placing a neutral
magistrate between police and the sanctity of people’s homes, noting that the
“police acting on their own cannot be trusted.” Id.; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (stating a man’s house is his castle and is “not to be invaded
by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers”).
55. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997) (“The text of the
Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less than an obligation to give
substantive content to the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due process of law.’”); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (“Were due process merely a procedural
safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life,
liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the
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addition to requiring the government to follow the procedures set
forth in the Constitution, the Due Process Clause provides
“heightened protection against government interference with
58
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” The court
determines whether an asserted right is worthy of heightened
protection by asking whether the right is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
59
they were sacrificed.” The Supreme Court has recognized several
fundamental rights worthy of heightened constitutional
60
protection. The right to be free from unreasonable searches
under the Fourth Amendment is considered a fundamental right
61
worthy of heightened protection under the due process clause.
Whenever a statute significantly interferes with a fundamental
right, the court applies a “strict scrutiny” test to determine whether
62
or not such interference violates substantive due process. In order
for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis, “the state must
demonstrate that the statute serves a compelling state interest, and
that the state’s objectives could not be achieved by any less
63
restrictive measures.” This means that the statute must be
“narrowly tailored” so that it “eliminates no more than the exact
64
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” If there is no compelling

future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to
individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.”).
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
59. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503–04 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
60. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the
fundamental right to privacy to include the fundamental right of a woman to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (recognizing a fundamental right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental right to marital privacy); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing a
fundamental right to have children); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
174 (1952) (finding it “offensive to human dignity” to stomach pump a defendant
against his will to obtain morphine pills to use against him at trial).
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (noting that Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) extended “the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal”).
62. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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state interest, or if the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling state interest, the statute fails strict scrutiny and violates
65
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
If a statute does not interfere with a fundamental right,
substantive due process requires only that the statute be analyzed
66
under a “rational basis” standard. In order to pass the rational
basis test, the court must determine “whether, in enacting
legislation, the legislature is acting in pursuit of permissible state
objectives and, if so, whether the means adopted are reasonably
67
related to accomplishment of those objectives.” This is a
deferential test, where courts do not act as policy makers; rather, it
is their duty to make sure the methods chosen are not an
68
unreasonable means of achieving a permissible result.
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection depends
greatly on whether or not a fundamental right has been
69
implicated. If the statute implicates a fundamental right, the
statute is scrutinized more closely, protecting individuals from
governmental overreach. If there is no fundamental right
implicated, great deference is given to the state. This is why, as this
case note will explore, it matters significantly whether a post-arrest
warrantless search of one’s breath is an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment. If it is, then any statute criminalizing
refusal to consent to such an unreasonable search would implicate
a fundamental right. Such a statute could only be constitutional if it
70
survives strict scrutiny.

65. Id.
66. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 965 (2015); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (noting that even though the court did not
recognize physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental right, the state legislature
still had the burden of demonstrating that banning physician-assisted suicide was
“rationally related to legitimate government interests”).
67. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 965.
68. Id.
69. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
70. Id. at 721 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to
infringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))).
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III. THE BERNARD DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Police received a report on August 5, 2012, that three
intoxicated individuals were trying to get a boat out of the water at
71
a boat launch in South Saint Paul. When the police arrived at the
boat launch, a witness informed them that the men’s truck became
stuck in the river while they were attempting to pull their boat out
72
of the water. One of the men, William Robert Bernard, was in his
73
underwear. As the officers approached the men, they could smell
74
a strong odor of alcohol coming from the group. Bernard
admitted to the officers that he had been drinking, but he denied
75
driving the truck. While speaking with Bernard, the officers
noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath; his bloodshot, watery
76
eyes; and the keys to the truck in his hand. After refusing to
perform a field sobriety test, the officers arrested Bernard on
77
suspicion of driving while impaired.
At the police station, the officers read Bernard the Implied
78
Consent Advisory and gave Bernard an opportunity to speak with
79
an attorney. Bernard called his mother, told officers he did not
80
need any more time, and refused to take a breath test.
The state charged Bernard with two counts of first-degree test
81
refusal. Bernard filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the

71. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. 2015).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014) (requiring a person arrested for
driving while impaired to be advised that Minnesota law requires him or her to
take a chemical test to determine if he or she is under the influence of alcohol,
that refusal to take the test is a crime, and that he or she has a right to consult an
attorney before taking the test, as long as there would not be any unnecessary
delay in the administration of the test).
79. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 764–65.
80. Id. at 765.
81. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765 n.1; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2,
169A.24, subdiv. 1 (criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test for
intoxication and making it a felony-level offense if the defendant has had three or
more impaired driving incidents within ten years). Because Bernard had four DWI
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grounds that the test-refusal statute violated his right to due process
because the statute criminalizes refusing an unreasonable,
82
warrantless search. The district court ruled that the test-refusal
statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but it dismissed the
charges, concluding the police needed a warrant to search
83
Bernard.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed this decision,
holding that the test refusal statute did not violate Bernard’s right
to due process because the officers could have secured a warrant to
84
search Bernard’s breath. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
reasoned that, because “the officer could have just as lawfully asked
an independent jurist to issue a search warrant to test Bernard’s
85
blood,” he was justified in asking Bernard to take the test. In
dictum, the court of appeals also addressed the state’s argument
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement applies in this case to justify the post-arrest search of
86
Bernard’s breath. It stated that the exception would not apply in
this case because an exigent circumstance would also need to exist
87
in order to satisfy that exception. The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted review.
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Bernard argued that
the test refusal statute, as applied to him, violated his right to
substantive due process because it criminalized his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unconstitutional, warrantless
88
searches. The Minnesota Supreme Court first turned to the
question of whether a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was
89
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. After ruling that such
a search was reasonable under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement, the court asked the followconvictions since 2006, this offense qualified as a felony first-degree driving while
impaired offense. See id. § 169A.24, subdiv. 1.
82. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765.
83. Id.
84. State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 47 (dictum).
87. Id.
88. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765.
89. Id. at 766.
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up question of whether such a search violated his right to
90
91
substantive due process. The court ruled that it did not.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that a “warrantless
search is generally unreasonable, unless it falls into one of the
92
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” The court
then stated that a search incident to a lawful arrest is one exception
93
to the warrant requirement. The court explained that this
exception allows police “to conduct a ‘full search of the person’
94
who has been lawfully arrested.” The majority held in this case
that a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was a search incident
to a lawful arrest and, therefore, did not violate his Fourth
95
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
The Minnesota Supreme Court justified its holding by
separating searches incident to arrest into two categories: (1)
police may search the person of the arrestee including pockets and
clothing, and (2) police may search “the area within the immediate
96
control of the arrestee.” The majority relied heavily on United
97
States v. Robinson to support its position. The court stated,
“Subsequent cases have addressed and limited the second type of
search under the search-incident-to-arrest exception . . . but they
have not narrowed the exception with respect to a search of the
98
arrestee’s body.”
The court supported this assertion by
contending that previous cases have held “a full search of the person is
not only an exception to the warrant requirement . . . but is also a
99
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” The majority went
on to say that their interpretation of Robinson was that a warrantless
search of a person’s body incident to arrest is “categorically
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to
100
The Minnesota Supreme Court
that person’s valid arrest.”
recognized the applicability of the “categorical rule” here that was
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
(2009)).
99.
100.

Id. at 773.
Id. at 773–74.
Id. at 766 (citing State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007)).
Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768–69 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224).
See id. at 769–71; see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 769 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332, 351
Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
Id. (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013)).
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addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Riley v. California
where “a search of the person of an arrestee [is] justified only by
101
the custodial arrest itself . . . .”
The court continued its reasoning by addressing Riley and
United States v. Chadwick to further distinguish a search of a person’s
body post-arrest from a search of the area within the person’s immediate
102
control. Both Riley and Chadwick placed limitations on the searchincident-to-arrest exception, but as the majority interpreted these
cases, it only limits searches of the area within the arrestee’s
103
control—it does not limit a search of one’s body.
Riley held, as the majority also pointed out, that a warrant is
required to search the contents of a cell phone on a person postarrest and that a warrantless search was not justified by the search104
incident-to-arrest exception. Chadwick also limited “the type of
property that may be categorically searched as part of a search
incident to arrest to property immediately associated with the
105
arrestee.” The court went on to say that because both Riley and
Chadwick involved searches of property within the immediate
control of the arrestee, any restrictions those holdings may have
placed on searches incident to arrest applied only to searches of
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, and did not apply
106
to searches of the arrestee’s body.
The majority supported its reasoning by comparing the search
of Bernard’s breath to other searches incident to arrest that courts
107
have held as valid. The court also supported its holding by citing
several other cases upholding the reasonableness of breathalyzer
108
tests as searches incident to arrest. The court concluded its

101. Id. at 770 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)).
102. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473; United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)).
103. Id. at 771.
104. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95; see also Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770.
105. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 771 (interpreting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
106. Id. at 771 (interpreting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, and Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
15).
107. Id. at 767 (citing State v. Riley, 303 Minn. 251, 255, 226 N.W.2d 907, 910
(1975)) (holding a warrantless inspection of an arrested man’s penis as a valid
search incident to a lawful arrest). The court also cites State v. Bonner, where the
court upheld the taking of an arrestee’s fingerprints and photographs, to illustrate
its comparison with Bernard. 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Minn. 1996).
108. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 767 (citing United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990,
994 (4th Cir. 1991)) (holding reasonable searches incident to a lawful arrest to
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analysis of the first issue by noting its inability to locate “a single
case” in the United States holding warrantless breath tests
109
impermissible under the exception.
Holding that a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was not
unreasonable, and therefore did not violate his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, the court
turned to the issue of whether such a search violated Bernard’s
110
right to substantive due process. The court began its due process
analysis by asking whether or not the challenged statute implicates
111
a fundamental right. The court reasoned that, because the search
of Bernard’s breath was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, no fundamental right was implicated by the test
112
refusal statute.
Because the statute did not implicate a
fundamental right, the court analyzed the test refusal statute under
113
the rational basis standard.
Finding that Minnesota has a
legitimate interest in highway safety, and that criminalizing drivers
suspected of driving while impaired for refusing to submit a breath
test was a reasonable means to further that interest, the court held
that the test refusal statute did not violate Bernard’s right to
114
substantive due process. Based on this analysis, the majority
affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision and Bernard’s
115
conviction.

include breathalyzer tests).
109. Id. at 767–68. But consider Williams v. State, decided after Bernard, where
the Florida District Court of Appeals held that neither officer safety, nor
preservation of evidence, would justify a breath test as permissible under the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 492 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (dictum), cert. granted, No. SC15-1417, 2015 WL 9594290 (Fla.
Dec. 30, 2015). Although the majority is technically correct in its assertions,
Williams draws into serious question the majority’s assumption that courts truly are
all in agreement on this issue.
110. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 773.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
114. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 773–74.
115. Id. at 774.
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The Dissenting Opinion
116

Justice Page and Justice Stras filed a joint dissenting opinion.
The dissent began by arguing that the majority erred in two
respects:
First, the court assumes, without support, that biological
material may be taken from inside a person’s body as part
of a search incident to arrest. Second, the court assumes,
again without support, that the rationales underlying the
search-incident-to-arrest exception—officer safety and
preventing the destruction of evidence—do not apply to
117
searches of a person.
The dissenters argued that “the Supreme Court has never
implied, much less stated, that the search-incident-to-arrest
exception extends to the forcible removal of substances from
118
within a person’s body.” They supported their argument by
pointing out the facts surrounding the search in Robinson, stating,
“The ‘full search of the person’ involved only a pat down and an
examination of the contents of Robinson’s pockets, not an invasive
119
search to retrieve biological material from within his body.” The
dissent argued that if the search had been more invasive factually, a
120
full search may not have been justified.
The dissent continued by criticizing the majority’s broad
interpretation of Robinson, quoting Riley for support. The dissenters
argued that “when [the Supreme Court] refers to a search of a
person incident to arrest, as in Robinson, it is talking about personal
121
property—that is, evidence—found on a person.” They pointed to
the Supreme Court in Robinson, and cautioned on the proper scope
of the exception, stating that “while Robinson’s categorical rule
strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical objects,
neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital
122
contents on cell phones.” The dissenting justices believed Riley
clarified that Robinson’s holding applies only to physical evidence
116. Id. (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting).
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 775.
120. Id. (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he interests supporting a search
incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street . . . .”
(quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983))).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)).
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rather than digital content; in turn they stated that “the only logical
conclusion is that removal of breath (or blood or urine) from the
body to discover an arrestee’s blood alcohol level is not part of a
123
search incident to arrest.”
The dissent’s second point of contention with the majority
opinion was the majority’s assumption that “the rationales for the
search-incident-to-arrest exception—officer safety and preventing
the destruction of evidence—d[id] not apply to searches of a
124
person.” The dissent believed this “assumption [wa]s in conflict
125
with Supreme Court precedent.”
The dissent argued that the majority unjustifiably separated
searches incident-to-arrest into two categories: searches of the
person and searches of the area within his or her immediate
126
control. It then argued that the majority further erred when it
applied the justifications of officer safety and preservation of
evidence only to the latter category of searches, allowing a full
127
search of the arrestee justified by the arrest itself. The dissent
found this separation unjustified by precedent, arguing that
Robinson and Riley did not reject the Chimel rationales of officer
safety and preservation of evidence as justifications for the searchincident-to-arrest exception, and did not extend the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception beyond the purposes it
128
intended to serve.
The dissent recognized the majority’s need to separate these
searches into two different categories; if the majority did not, the
Chimel rationales would not justify a search of Bernard’s breath:
The only justification for allowing police to conduct a
warrantless breath test is the preservation of evidence due
to the natural dissipation of alcohol from a person’s
bloodstream. In McNeely, however, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the proposition that the natural
metabolization of alcohol constitutes a per se exigency
129
justifying a warrantless blood test.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id.
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The dissent believed the majority’s separation of a search of
one’s body from a search of the area within his or her immediate
control and recognition of a categorical “bright-line” rule was
simply an attempt to “readopt[] a per se exigency under a different
130
name.”
The dissent then moved to the topic of whether the test refusal
statute was constitutional. The dissent concluded “that, in
131
Bernard’s case, it [wa]s not.” The dissent noted that “a state
cannot criminalize the refusal to consent to an illegal warrantless
132
search.” They end their constitutional analysis by arguing that the
state cannot criminalize Bernard’s right to refuse unconstitutional
searches; because of this, the test refusal statute violated Bernard’s
133
right to due process.
Although the dissent concluded that the test refusal statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Bernard, it also acknowledged that
there might be a situation where it would be constitutional to
criminalize a test refusal, such as when it would be extremely
difficult or impossible for law enforcement to get a search
134
warrant.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Unjustifiable Separation of Searches Incident to Arrest

Separating the search of a person’s body and a search of the area
within his or her immediate control incident to a lawful arrest is not
supported by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The United States
Supreme Court in Chimel made no attempt to separate searches of
an arrestee’s person from the area within his or her immediate
control. In fact, the Supreme Court in Chimel seemed to think that

130. Id. at 779.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967)).
133. Id. at 780.
134. Id. at 779–80 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013)).
The United States Supreme Court in McNeely also acknowledged this possibility,
noting that even though a warrantless blood test did not constitute a per se
exigency, there might be situations where, because of the difficulty to obtain a
warrant, an exigency could exist, justifying a warrantless blood test. McNeely, 133 S.
Ct. at 1568. Such circumstances would, however, “vary depending upon the
circumstances in the case.” Id.
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the underlying rationales applied to both types of searches. The
Court’s rationale in Chimel behind the search-incident-to-arrest
exception applies to both types of searches, as is evidenced by the
use of the disjunctive word “or” in the phrase “[assaulting an officer
and destroying weapons] might easily happen where the weapon or
evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate
136
control.”
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant also made no
distinction between a search of a person’s body and a search of the
area within his or her immediate control. Again, the language the
Court used seemed to reiterate that the rationales behind the
search-incident-to-arrest exception apply to both types of
137
searches.
Quoting Chimel, the Supreme Court in Gant
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s justification for searches
incident to arrest, noting that “searches incident to arrest are
reasonable ‘in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might
seek to use’ and ‘in order to prevent [the] concealment or
138
destruction’ of evidence . . . .” Like Chimel, the language in Gant
suggests the rationales underlying searches of an arrestee’s body
are the same rationales underlying searches of the area within his
or her immediate control.
The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that both Robinson and
139
Riley justify making such a distinction. However, a closer reading
of Riley suggests it actually narrowed the scope of the search of a

135. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (“The rule allowing
contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons
and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as
well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s
person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a
search is remote in time or place from the arrest.” (quoting Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964))).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (“In Chimel, we held that a
search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area
‘within his immediate control’, . . . . That limitation, which continues to define the
boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest
is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal
or destroy.” (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763)).
138. Id. (alteration in original).
139. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770.
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140

person. As the dissent in Bernard points out, Riley clarified that
“while Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in
the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much
141
force with respect to digital content on cell phones.” Observing a
categorical rule in the context of physical objects found on a person is
completely consistent with the Chimel rationales of officer safety
and evidence preservation. Physical objects can be both a weapon
and destroyable evidence. It makes sense why the Supreme Court
would justify a search of a cigarette package found on a person as a
search incident to a lawful arrest based on officer safety and
142
evidence preservation.
But Riley refused to extend the Robinson holding to the
contents of cell phones because “[t]here are no comparable risks
[to officer safety or evidence destruction] when the search is of
143
digital data.” Further, nowhere in Robinson or Riley does the
Supreme Court say the Chimel rationales only apply to searches of
144
the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. The
Minnesota Supreme Court is correct in its assertion that the
145
146
particular cases it cited, Chadwick and Riley, limited the type of
property that can be searched incident to arrest, but that is not to
140. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014) (“In 1926, Learned
Hand observed . . . that it is ‘a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and
use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which
may incriminate him.’ If his pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no
longer true.”) (citation omitted).
141. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 775 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
142. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (“Having in the
course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was
entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was
entitled to seize them as ‘fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband’ probative of
criminal conduct.”).
143. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
144. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 778 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[N]either
Robinson nor Riley rejected the Chimel rationales as bookends for the circumstances
under which the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies.”). While Robinson
does state that “[e]xamination of this Court’s decisions shows that these two
propositions have been treated quite differently,” it goes on to say that the two
types of searches are “likewise conceded in principle.” 414 U.S. at 224 (emphasis
added). The Robinson decision then quotes Chimel and its underlying rationales of
officer safety and evidence preservation. Id. at 225–26.
145. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a warrantless search of a footlocker was
not justified as a search incident to arrest).
146. 134 S. Ct. 2473.
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say that the underlying principles of Chimel do not apply to other
types of searches incident to arrest.
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court tried to justify its
position by pointing to State v. Riley, which allowed a warrantless
visual search of an arrested man’s penis under the search-incident147
to-arrest exception.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
failed to mention State v. Lussier, which came to the opposite
148
conclusion. Lussier stated that the holding in State v. Riley did not
apply to its situation because the search in Lussier went
“significantly further than a visual inspection and involve[d] a
149
greater privacy interest.” The court in Lussier concluded that the
150
search was not justified by the arrest alone.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Lussier made
no distinction between a search of person’s body and a search of
the area immediately surrounding him or her; in fact, the language
again seems to suggest the exact opposite:
[N]either justification for the search-incident-to-arrest
exception—officer safety and preservation of evidence—
was present here given that respondent was handcuffed
and was under constant police observation. Accordingly,
we conclude that because respondent was restrained and
observed by officers at all times, the warrantless collection
of evidence from his genitals was not justified by the need
151
to preserve evidence.
Lussier, Chimel, and Gant all draw into serious question the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s claim that a “categorical rule” exists
152
allowing a full search of the person of an arrestee. These cases
153
are not the only ones to do so. It is for these reasons the
147. See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 767; see also State v. Riley, 303 Minn. 251, 254,
226 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1975).
148. 770 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a warrantless
SARS examination of the defendant’s genitals was not valid under the searchincident-to-arrest exception), reh’g denied, (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009).
149. Id.
150. Id. (stating the search involved actual touching of the defendant’s
genitals while the search in Riley involved only a visual inspection).
151. Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009)).
152. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770.
153. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding a warrantless
search of defendant’s fingernails was justified where probable cause to arrest
existed, noting “[t]he basis for this exception is that when an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for a police officer to expect the arrestee to use any weapons he may
have and to attempt to destroy any incriminating evidence then in his
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Minnesota Supreme Court should have analyzed the warrantless
search of Bernard’s breath under the rationales set forth in Chimel.
B.

Under Proper Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, a Breath Test Is Not
Justified as a Search Incident to Arrest

As the dissent points out, the majority must separate searches
of one’s body and searches of the area within his or her immediate
154
control in order to reach its result. Application of the Chimel
rationale behind searches incident to arrest—officer safety, and
155
evidence preservation —reveals that a warrantless search of one’s
156
breath is not justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
To begin with, a breath test is clearly not being used for officer
safety. Therefore, the only rationale that could justify a breath test
as a search incident to arrest is evidence preservation. Searches for
evidence preservation are justified to prevent the active
concealment or destruction of evidence, that is, to prevent the
157
defendant from concealing or destroying evidence. A defendant
cannot actively destroy the concentration of alcohol in his body. As
discussed above, the natural dissipation of alcohol alone does not
158
justify a search of one’s body under the Fourth Amendment.
McNeely made it clear that there was no per se exigency from the
possession”); State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000) (“One exemption
from the warrant requirement is that a person’s body and the area within his or
her immediate control may be searched incident to a lawful arrest . . . . This
exemption ensures officer safety by allowing officers to remove any weapons the
arrestee might reach and also prevents the arrestee from tampering with or
destroying evidence or contraband.”) (citation omitted).
154. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 778 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting).
155. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
156. Gant, 566 U.S. at 339 (stating if it is impossible for an arrestee to gain
access to the area officers are trying to search, then the exception does not exist).
157. See id. (“That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the
exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate
with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of
the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”) (emphasis added);
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. . . . [This includes] the area ‘within his immediate
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”) (emphasis added).
158. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (“[T]he natural
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every
case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.”).
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natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream. Because a
defendant cannot actively destroy the alcohol in his bloodstream,
and because the Supreme Court has already rejected the natural
dissipation of alcohol as a per se exigent circumstance authorizing
a warrantless search, the evidence preservation rationale in Chimel
does not justify a warrantless breath test as a search incident to
160
arrest. Therefore, the search-incident-to-arrest exception should
not have been applied in this case.
C.

Despite the Bernard Holding, Your Body Is Still Your Temple

It is undisputed that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
161
not places.” “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
162
intrusion by the State.” Bodily integrity is at the heart of Fourth
163
Amendment privacy concerns. Because of this, we should not
accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s assertion that a warrantless
164
intrusion into a body cavity is ever justified.
As stated, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under
165
the Fourth Amendment. Because personal privacy and bodily
integrity are at the heart of the Fourth Amendment, courts must
159. Id.
160. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763) (“If there is no
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers
seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are
absent and the rule does not apply.”).
161. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (“[M]ore particularly, it protects people from
unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy.”); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary doctrine was “an essential part of the right to privacy”).
162. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
163. See id. at 772 (“The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value
of our society.”); see also McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (“[A] compelled physical
intrusion beneath [the defendant’s] skin and into his veins [constitutes] an
invasion of bodily integrity [that] implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and
deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760
(1985))).
164. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have
been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”).
165. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”).
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balance the degree that an exception to the warrant requirement
impedes on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
against the degree that an exception promotes legitimate
166
governmental interests. The Supreme Court has invalidated many
searches that cross the line from promoting governmental interests
into the realm of intruding upon individual autonomy and
167
privacy.
Of course, the government has a compelling interest in
168
protecting people from drunk drivers. However, creating an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is not
169
“needed for the promotion” of this interest. If the Minnesota
Supreme Court is worried about people refusing to take chemical
tests to determine if they are intoxicated—which would allow the
evidence in their breath, blood, and urine to slowly dissipate while
a warrant is secured—a much simpler remedy is available.
Instead of criminalizing test refusal under the guise of
expedited testing, the Minnesota legislature could lower the
statutory intoxication limit or extend the time frame that law
170
enforcement officials have to secure a test. Once a warrant is
secured, then the search is reasonable under the Fourth
171
Amendment, provided officers abide by the warrant.
If the
legislature were to criminalize a warranted search as a test refusal, it

166. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
167. See, e.g., id. at 2485 (arguing that, because cell phones “place vast
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” the privacy
interests associated with warrantless searches of cell phones outweigh the
comparable risk of losing evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969).
168. In 2012, 114 people were killed by drunk drivers in Minnesota alone; this
constituted 29% of all traffic related deaths. 2012 Drunk Driving Fatalities by State,
MADD BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.madd.org/blog/2013/november/2012
-drunk-driving-fatalities.html.
169. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300).
170. A person is statutorily intoxicated for the purposes of the driving-whileimpaired statute if “the person’s alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured
within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of
the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1(5) (2014).
171. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 306 (2015) (“When law
enforcement officers execute a valid search warrant and act in a reasonable
manner to protect themselves from harm, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated.”).
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would be free to do so, because the Fourth Amendment does not
172
protect against reasonable searches and seizures.
To minimize a person’s right to personal privacy, individual
autonomy, and bodily integrity is one thing, but to argue that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence sanctions it is quite another. As
173
“every man’s house is his castle,” so too is his body his temple. It
seems contradictory to hold that people have a greater privacy
interest in the contents of their cell phones and in their homes
than they do inside their body cavities—their bladder or inside
their veins. As the dissent in Bernard points out, if the digital
contents of a cell phone are safe from a search incident to arrest,
“the only logical conclusion is that the removal of breath (or blood
or urine) from the body to discover an arrestee’s blood alcohol
174
level is not part of a search incident to arrest.” Just as the
Supreme Court in Riley refused to extend the holding in Robinson
to the search of data on a cell phone, and the Court in Chimel and
Mincey refused to allow the search of one’s home incident to arrest,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should not have justified a
175
warrantless search of Bernard’s breath.
D.

Due Process

As mentioned above, due process provides “heightened
protection against government interference with certain
176
fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Fundamental rights are
those rights and liberties that are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
177
were sacrificed.’” The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

172. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
174. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 776 (Minn. 2015) (Page and Stras, JJ.,
dissenting).
175. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); see also Bernard, 859
N.W.2d at 777 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[A] person taking a breath test
must insert a tube into his or her mouth and then comply with the officer’s
instructions [on how] to blow into the tube at a specified rate . . . . The court does
not cite a single Supreme Court case authorizing such a profound intrusion into a
person’s bodily integrity during a search incident to arrest.”).
176. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see supra Part II.D.
177. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
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Amendment imposes a duty on the Supreme Court to review laws
of the states to determine whether laws violate our fundamental
178
rights and liberty interests.
The Supreme Court considers state action unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause if the conduct “shocks the
179
conscience.” For example, in Rochin v. California, the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction based on conduct that did just that—
180
conduct that is not too far off from Bernard’s situation. When
officers entered the open Rochin residence and forced their way
into his bedroom on a tip that he was selling narcotics, they found
181
him sitting on his bed partly dressed with his common-law wife.
Upon seeing the officers, Rochin grabbed two capsules off his
182
nightstand and shoved them in his mouth.
Rochin was
handcuffed and taken to a hospital where officers ordered doctors
to force “an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin’s stomach
183
against his will.” After doctors pumped Rochin’s stomach against
his will, he vomited up the capsules, which were used against him at
184
trial and resulted in his conviction. The Supreme Court reversed
his conviction, finding that the officer’s conduct shocked the
185
conscious and violated Rochin’s right to due process of law.
By criminalizing Bernard’s right to refuse an unreasonable
search, the Minnesota legislature has effectively allowed officers to
pry open a defendant’s mouth and shove a tube inside of it in
order to gain evidence to use against them at trial without a
warrant. You can refuse, but you will be charged with a new
186
crime. This is no choice in any sense of the word—the option to
178. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (noting that the Supreme
Court reviews laws “in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.” (quoting
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945))).
179. Id. at 172.
180. Id. at 174.
181. Id. at 166.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 172 (“Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach’s contents—this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods
too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”).
186. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014).
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refuse a drug test presents only the appearance of a choice;
however, the individual will be charged regardless. The Minnesota
test refusal statute violates one of our most deeply rooted
fundamental liberties: the right to be free from unreasonable
187
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
If a statute violates a fundamental right under the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, its constitutionality is subject to
188
strict scrutiny. Having argued that a breath test is not justified
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should have analyzed the mandatory breath test
189
statute under a strict scrutiny standard. While the state has a
compelling interest in highway safety, the test-refusal statute is not
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. There is a much less
restrictive means to achieve this interest: either lower the statutory
190
intoxication level or extend the time allowed to secure a warrant.
After that, go get a warrant.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Bernard that a statute
criminalizing the refusal to take a breath test did not violate
Bernard’s right to due process because a warrantless breath test was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to a
191
lawful arrest. Review of the relevant case law has demonstrated
that the court misinterpreted the search-incident-to-arrest
exception and failed to consider important public policy
considerations required by the Fourth Amendment. Holding a
warrant is required to search the contents of a cell phone and to
search one’s dwelling after a lawful arrest, but finding a warrant is

187. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects people’s
“freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.”).
188. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
189. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
190. See MINN. STAT. § 169.20 (2014).
191. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773–74 (Minn. 2015).
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not required to stick a tube in one’s mouth after a lawful arrest is
confusing, inconsistent, and deserves reconsideration by the U.S.
192
Supreme Court.

192. On June 15, 2015, Bernard petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 141470 (U.S. June 15, 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition on
December 11, 2015. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, cert. granted sub nom., Bernard v.
Minnesota, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015); David Chanen, U.S. Supreme Court to Review
Constitutionality of Minnesota’s DWI Test-Refusal Law, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS) (Dec.
12, 2015, 7:49 AM), http://www.startribune.com/u-s
-supreme-court-toreview-constitutionality-of-minnesota-s-dwi-test-refusal-law /361634621. The U.S.
Supreme Court did not state explicitly why it took the case. Id. However, it usually
takes cases for a specific reason: the case may have an impact on the entire
country, there may be a split among the federal circuits, or a case may alter
current precedent. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 17, 2015, 8:24 PM),
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/abouteducational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1. This case will no doubt have
national impact, as forty-seven states currently have similar implied-consent laws.
Chanen, supra note 192. Minnesota’s implied consent law is somewhat unique in
that it is only one of twelve to actually criminalize refusing to take a chemical test
following a DWI arrest. Id. It is estimated that the Court’s holding will affect
approximately 20,000 chemical tests in Minnesota each year, not to mention the
effect it will have on other cases around the country. Id. Although not always, it is
believed that the Court will generally hear a case in order to reverse it. Stephen
Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Scoring the Circuits, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22,
2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06 /scotus-for-law-studentssponsored-by-bloomberg-law-scoring-the-circuits (noting that between 2011 and
2014, the Court reversed approximately 70.5% of the cases it reviewed). The Court
will review Bernard, along with a North Dakota case, to determine the
constitutionality of the implied-consent laws. Dan Koewler, Chuck Ramsay
Interviewed by Minnesota Lawyer Regarding the Bernard Case, MINN. DWI DEFENSE
(December 18, 2015), http://www.mndwidefenseblog.com/articles /fourthamendment. Minnesota criminal defense lawyers are hopeful, and “don’t think it’s
likely that the U.S. Supreme Court just wants to pat Minnesota and North Dakota
on the back and say, ‘Hey, you’re doing a great job of upholding the United States
Constitution!’” Id. Hopefully the U.S. Supreme Court will acknowledge that the
U.S. Constitution applies all of the time, whether its two o’clock in the afternoon,
or two o’clock in the morning.

